DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2004-013 
 
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
AUTHOR:  Andrews, J. 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title 10 and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The BCMR docketed the 
case  on  November  3, 2003,  upon  receipt of the  applicant’s  completed  application  and 
military records. 
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This final decision, dated October 13, 2004, is signed by the three duly appointed 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The  applicant—who  received  a  general  discharge  under  honorable  conditions 
from  the  Coast  Guard  on  February  9,  1989—asked  the  Board  to  correct  his  record  by 
upgrading his discharge to honorable; by removing “Misconduct” as the narrative rea-
son for separation shown on his discharge form, DD 214; and by granting him a retire-
ment with pay and benefits as a chief machinery technician (MKC; pay grade E-7). 
 
 
The applicant stated that in December 1986, five other members of his division —
some of whom were his subordinates—were caught stealing government property.  The 
applicant alleged that he had previously told his supervisor, Mr. P, that he suspected 
some theft was occurring and that Mr. P advised him to try to determine “who, what, 
where  and  when”  before  contacting  the  Coast  Guard  Investigative  Service.    The 
applicant stated that one of the five members was caught stealing and turned the other 
four in “to get a better chance at a lighter sentence.” 
 

 
The applicant alleged that at some point, the prosecutor, Mr. B, decided that the 
applicant  was  “the  ramrod  of  what  he  called  ‘an  enormous  amount  of  crime’  and 
charged [the applicant] with the items that were stolen.  He gave all five of these sailors 
testimonial  immunity  and  they  remained  in  the  Coast  Guard  to  testify  against  me  … 
saying  I  had  given  these  men  a  direct  order  to  steal  the  property.”    The  applicant 
pointed out that the property had been stolen over a two-year period and asked, if he 
had actually given such orders, why did the five sailors wait until they were caught to 
report the abuse. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  in  1987  he  was  erroneously  charged  with  and  con-
victed of theft of government property.  He alleged that no government property was 
found in his possession and that at first he did not take the charges seriously and did 
not hire a lawyer.  He alleged that he was a ”scapegoat” for someone else’s crime.  He 
alleged that he offered to let the Coast Guard search all of his personal property, but 
they  did  not.    He  alleged  that  all  of  the  stolen  property  was  found  in  the  other  five 
men’s possession and that none of the paperwork used to acquire the stolen tools had 
his signature on it.  
 
 
The  applicant  argued  that  the  punishment  he  received  “was  too  harsh  for  the 
crime.  I paid the Coast Guard for the property someone else stole, spent one year in 
federal  prison,  and  lost  all  my  retirement.”    He  alleged  that  he  was  required  to  pay 
$2,400 for the cost of the stolen property, as well as court costs.  He alleged that people 
convicted of similar crimes had received much less punishment.  He also alleged that it 
was  unjust  for  the  Coast  Guard  to  punish  him  with  the  general  discharge  and  no 
retirement because he was never court-martialed but was convicted in federal court.  He 
stated that because he was honorably discharged and reenlisted on December 4, 1987, 
ten  days  before  his  court-martial,  the  Coast  Guard  lost  the  authority  to  court-martial 
him, and his case was “handed over to the federal court system.” 
 
 
The applicant also stated that upon reporting to the training center where he had 
worked on September 28, 1988—the day after his release from prison—he was advised 
to return home until discharged.  He alleged that he should have been allowed to work 
until his discharge on February 9, 1989. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  in  1999,  the  Coast  Guard’s  Discharge  Review  Board 
(DRB) “was going to change my discharge to ‘honorable’ until they found the letter I 
signed saying I ‘could’ be deprived of my rights as a veteran.”  The applicant alleged 
that he signed this letter only because the prosecuting attorney was harassing his family 
and he “was fearful they might find some other way to lock me up again.” 
 
In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted copies of some of his mili-
 
tary  records  and  letters  from  retired  military  members.    A  retired  Coast  Guard  com-
mander who met the applicant in 1993 described him as a hard-working businessman 

and  great  asset  to  the  community.    A  retired  rear  admiral  of  the  Navy  described  the 
applicant  as  a  very  conscientious  worker  whose  “conduct  has  always  been  above 
reproach” and “by far the most active person in community affairs” in their county.  A 
retired major in the county police department stated that the applicant and his wife “are 
very much involved in civic and service projects” and “are to be commended for their 
good volunteer work.”  In 1988, a car dealership owner wrote on the applicant’s behalf 
that the applicant was “of good moral character,” reliable, trustworthy, and committed 
to the improvement of the community. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 

In October 1983, the applicant was assigned to work as chief of the motor pool at 

 
On February 28, 1972, the applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard,  having previ-
ously served about eighteen months in the Army.  He attended engineering “A” School 
to become a third class engineering petty officer and in 1974  was  transferred into the 
MK rating and advanced to MK2.  He advanced to MK1 in 1976 and to MKC in 1979.  
Over the course of his career, he accumulated more than five years of sea duty. 
 
 
a Reserve Training Center.   
 
 
received an honorable discharge.  On December 4, 1987, he reenlisted for three years. 
 
 
criminal charges alleging that: 

On  December  14,  1987,  a  federal  grand  jury  indicted  the  applicant  on  seven 

On  December  3,  1987,  the  applicant’s  then  current  enlistment  ended.    He 

on  January  29,  1987,  he  stole  and  converted  to  his  use  “power 

 
1. 
between February 1985 and August 1985, he stole and converted to 
his use “assorted hand tools which had been received from [a U.S. Naval 
Weapons Station] of a total value of approximately five hundred dollars 
($500.00), the military property of the United States”; 
 
2. 
at the motor pool on or about June 24, 1986, he stole and converted 
to his use “a variable speed orbital action jig saw and a professional high 
torque three-eighths inch (3/8”) power drill” valued at about $365.00; 
 
3. 
shears and blade heads” valued at about $417.00; 
 
4. 
uum cleaner” valued at more than $100.00; 
 
5. 
“one battery charger” valued at about $235.00; 
 
6. 
on  or  about  March  1,  1986,  he  “knowingly  and  unlawfully  con-
veyed or disposed of without authority by giving [to someone else] a tool 
kit containing assorted hand tools” valued at about $220.00; and 
 
7. 
on or about March 1986, he stole and converted to his use “a Vano 
Blower,  a  tripod  mount,  and  two  hose  attachments”  valued  at  about 
$1,388.00.” 

on or about December 24, 1986,  he stole and converted to his  use 

on or about March 1986, he stole and converted to his use “a vac-

 

 
On February 12, 1988, the applicant was convicted in federal court on five of the 
counts (2, 3, 5, 6, and 7).  Count 1 was dismissed.  The jury acquitted the applicant on 
count 4.  He was sentenced to one year’s incarceration for each of the other five counts, 
to  be  served  simultaneously,  and  restitution  of  $2,405  and  court  fees.    The  court  also 
ordered the Coast Guard to delay separating the applicant until the appeal was  com-
plete.  
 
 
On  March  21,  1988,  the  applicant  was  incarcerated.    On  March  23,  1988,  his 
Executive Officer (XO) made an administrative entry in his record stating that on Feb-
ruary 12, 1988, he had been convicted in federal court for theft of government property 
worth $2,405, and sentenced to one year in jail, restitution of $2,405, and a $250 court 
assessment.  The XO prepared a special evaluation assigning the applicant the lowest 
possible mark (one) for conduct, using resources, setting an example, professionalism, 
judgment, responsibility, and integrity and terminated his eligibility for a good conduct 
award. 
 
 
On April 8, 1988, after being advised that the Coast Guard intended to discharge 
him administratively, the applicant requested a hearing before an Administrative Dis-
charge Board (ADB).  The hearing was delayed due to the applicant’s incarceration and 
to the court order to stay any separation action against the applicant. 
 
 
duty the next day but was apparently told to stay at home. 
 

On September 27, 1988, the applicant was released from prison.  He reported for 

On November 14, 1988, the applicant’s appeal of his conviction was denied.  The 

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that the applicant  

 
was in charge of the motor pool, and in connection therewith, he was authorized to pur-
chase parts, tools and supplies from various commercial sources.  Appellant in  his free 
time,  operated  a  business,  known  as  “xxxxxx”,  through  which  he  engaged  in  selling, 
installing  and  repairing  heating  and  air-conditioning  equipment.    The  testimony  of  the 
various  government  witnesses,  many  of  whom  served  with  the  appellant  in  the  Coast 
Guard,  was  sufficient  to  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  various  charges  upon 
which he was convicted. …  The appellant’s real complaint is that the government never 
executed a search warrant of his home or business in an effort to find the articles of prop-
erty allegedly stolen from the United States.  He argues that the failure of the government 
to  search  his  premises  weakens  the  government’s  case.    This  may  be  true,  but  this  is  a 
matter for jury argument …  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s handling 
of the case … . 
 
On December 29, 1988, the applicant and his counsel signed the following letter: 
 
1. 
I have been advised by my Commanding Officer that he is recommending me for 
a discharge from the Coast Guard be reason of misconduct and the reasons therefor.  He 
has also advised me that as an enlisted person who has completed more than eight years 
of service, I have the following rights, unless waived in writing: 

 

 

a. 
than three officers. 
b. 
c. 

My case will be heard by an administrative discharge board of not less 

I may appear in person before such administrative discharge board. 
I may be represented by counsel. 

2. 
I hereby waive my right to a  hearing before an administrative discharge board 
provided Commandant determines that I should be awarded a discharge under honor-
able  conditions.    I  know  that  I  have  been  convicted  of  theft  from  the  government,  and 
that is not taken lightly by the Coast Guard.  I also know that I have more than 17 years 
of Coast Guard service with no other blemishes of any kind in my record.  Therefore, I 
feel that an honorable or general discharge would better characterize my overall service 
to the Coast Guard than a discharge Under Other Than Honorable Conditions.  I feel that 
it would be in the Coast Guard’s as well as my own best interests to discharge me expe-
ditiously.  … 
 
I  further  understand  that  if  a  general  discharge  is  issued  to  me  that  I  could  be 
3. 
deprived of many of the rights as a veteran under state and federal legislation; and that I 
may expect to encounter substantial prejudice in civilian life in situations where the type 
of service rendered and the characterization of discharge may have a bearing. … 

 
 
On  January  9,  1989,  the  applicant’s  CO  forwarded  this  letter  and  other  corre-
spondence to the Commandant and recommended that the applicant receive a general 
discharge under honorable conditions.  On January 19, 1989, the CO sent copies of the 
indictment and judgment of conviction to the Commandant. 
 
 
On January 28, 1989, the Commandant ordered that the applicant receive a gen-
eral discharge by reason of misconduct within thirty days due to his trial and conviction 
by civil authorities, pursuant to Article 12-B-18 of the Personnel Manual.  
 
On February 9, 1989, the applicant was discharged.  His DD 214 shows that he 
 
received a general discharge for misconduct with an RE-4 reenlistment code (ineligible), 
pursuant to Article 12-B-18 of the Personnel Manual.  He had completed a total of 18 
years, 5 months, and 19 days of active service. 
 
 
On June 15, 2000, the DRB reviewed the applicant’s discharge.  The DRB recom-
mended that relief be denied, noting that it “initially recommended that [the applicant] 
receive an Honorable Discharge based on the fact that the member did not receive an 
Admin Discharge Board.  However, further examination of the member’s record found 
that he had waived his right to an ADB.  Therefore, the Board felt, [his] DD-214 should 
stand as issued.”  The DRB stated that under Article 12-B-18 of the Personnel Manual, 
the  Commandant  could  direct  the  discharge  of  a  member  for  misconduct  due  to 
“[c]onviction  by  foreign  or  domestic  civil  authorities  or  action  taken  tantamount  to  a 
finding  of  guilty  for  an  offense  for  which  the  maximum  penalty  under  the  Uniform 
Code of Military Justice is death or confinement longer than one year involving moral 
turpitude.”  In addition, the DRB found that the applicant’s history of community serv-

ice did not justify upgrading his discharge.  On April 9, 2001, the DRB’s recommenda-
tion was approved. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 

On March 30, 2004, the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) of the Coast Guard sub-

mitted an advisory opinion recommending that the Board deny relief in this case. 

 
TJAG alleged that the applicant’s request was untimely and that he had not sub-
mitted any evidence to show that it is in the interest of justice for the Board to waive the 
three-year statute of limitations. 

 
Regarding the merits of the case, TJAG argued that the applicant has “failed to 
present  any  evidence  that  he  was  improperly  convicted  or  that  the  Coast  Guard 
improperly discharged him from the service.”  TJAG argued that “[a]bsent strong evi-
dence  to  the  contrary,  government  officials  are  presumed  to  have  carried  out  their 
duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.”  Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 
(1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  TJAG alleged that the 
record indicates that the applicant “was properly convicted in federal court and subse-
quently knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to an [ADB] in exchange for a dis-
charge ‘under honorable conditions.’” 

 
TJAG attached to his advisory opinion a memorandum on the case prepared by 
the Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC).  CGPC alleged that there is no merit to 
the  applicant’s  allegation  that  his  administrative  discharge  was  disproportionately 
harsh.  CGPC alleged that the Coast Guard “routinely discharges members convicted by 
civil authorities for this and other types of serious offenses.”  CGPC also argued that the 
applicant “was afforded all his due process rights” and that he waived his right to an 
ADB. 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On March 31, 2004, the Chair sent the applicant a copy of the views of the Coast 
Guard and invited him to respond within 30 days.  The applicant requested a 90-day 
extension, and his response was received on July 27, 2004. 
 
 
The applicant again asserted his innocence and alleged that throughout the pro-
ceedings against him, he acted out of fear that the Coast Guard “would try to pursue 
some other trumped up charge.”  He also indicated that he had only waived his right to 
an ADB because he wanted to do as he was told so that his life could begin again.  His 
Senior Chief had told him that if he did not sign the letter waiving his right to an ADB 
he would “have to go through a lot more trouble to get this over with.” 
 

 
The applicant asked—if he was guilty of theft—then why did he receive an hon-
orable  discharge  on  December  4,  1987;  why  did  no  one  search  his  property  for  the 
missing property; why was his signature not on the invoices presented in court; why 
were  the  witnesses  against  him  granted  immunity;  why  did  the  witnesses  not  come 
forward with their accusations earlier; and why was the stolen property found in the 
hands of the witnesses.  The applicant argued that he should not have been convicted 
based on the slim evidence, most of which strongly implicated the witnesses rather than 
himself.    He  alleged  that  it  was  unfair  that  the  jury  heard  the  evidence  for  count  1 
because the count was dismissed.  He alleged that this confused and biased the jury. 
 

APPLICABLE LAW 

 

 
Rule 201(d) of the Rules for Courts-Martial in effect in 1988 provided that, unless 
an alleged offense is purely military in nature, such as failure to obey an order, a mem-
ber can be tried by a “proper civilian tribunal,” rather than by court-martial. 
 
 Under  Article  12-B-18.b.(1)  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  the  Commandant  could 
 
separate a member for misconduct with a discharge under other than honorable condi-
tions (OTH); a general discharge under honorable conditions; or an honorable discharge 
due to “[c]onviction by civil authorities … of an offense for which the maximum pen-
alty  under  the  Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice  [UCMJ]  is  death  or  confinement  in 
excess of one year.”  Under Article 121 of the UCMJ, the maximum penalty for larceny 
of property valued in excess of $100.00 was “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay  and  allowances,  and  confinement  for  5  years,”  and  the  maximum  penalty  for 
wrongful  appropriation  of  such  property  was  “[d]ishonorable  discharge,  forfeiture  of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years.” 
 
 
Article 12-B-18.d. of the Personnel Manual provided that the provisions of Article 
12-B-32  applied  to  all  members  with  eight  or  more  years  of  active  service  who  were 
being  recommended  for  discharge  due  to  misconduct.    Article  12-B-32  provided  the 
procedures for ADBs.  Article 12-B-32.a.(1) provided that a member could be discharged 
without an ADB if the member waived his right to an ADB in writing. 
 

On July 7, 1976, the delegate of the Secretary informed the BCMR of the follow-

ing determination, which has never been countermanded:  
 

[T]he Board should  not upgrade discharges  solely  on the basis of post-service conduct.  
The situation in which a man is granted a less than honorable discharge under circum-
stances all agree were just, and then goes on to become Albert Schweitzer, is one that—if 
it ever occurs—is properly handled by an exemplary rehabilitation certificate or a Presi-
dential pardon. 
 
This emphatically does not mean that the justness of a discharge must be judged by the 
criteria  prevalent  at  the  time  it  was  rendered.    The  Board  is  entirely  free  to  take  into 
account changes in community mores, civilian as well as military, since the time of dis-

charge was rendered, and upgrade a discharge if it is judged to be unduly severe in light 
of contemporary standards. …. [T]he Board should not upgrade [a] discharge unless it is 
convinced, after having considered all the evidence [in the record], that in light of today’s 
standards the discharge was disproportionately severe vis-à-vis the conduct in response 
to which it was imposed. 

 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

1. 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this  matter  pursuant  to  10  U.S.C. 

§ 1552. 
 
2. 

The  Coast  Guard  argued  that  the  application  was  untimely.1    However, 
the applicant filed his application within three years of the date the Coast Guard Dis-
charge  Review  Board  declined  to  upgrade  his  discharge.2    Therefore,  the  Board  finds 
that his application was timely.3 

 
3. 

The  applicant  alleged  that  because  he  received  an  honorable  discharge 
and  was  reenlisted  on  December  4,  1987—after  the  Coast  Guard  had  completed  its 
investigation of the alleged offenses—he should not have received a general discharge 
from  the  Coast  Guard  on  February  9,  1989.    However,  an  honorable  discharge  from 
military  service  does not  mean that  a  member  has  been  found  innocent  of  an  alleged 
offense.4  In the applicant’s case, the new contract was necessary only because the appli-
cant’s  prior  contract  was  terminating,  and  an  honorable  discharge  was  proper  at  the 
time because he had not yet been convicted of any offense.   

  
4. 

The  applicant  complained  that  he  was  supposed  to  have  been  tried  by 
court-martial on December 14, 1987, but was not.  There is no evidence in the record to 
support the applicant’s allegation.  However, under Rule 201(d) of the Rules for Courts-
Martial in effect at the time, a member charged with theft could be tried by a “proper 
civilian tribunal,” rather than by court-martial.  The applicant has not proved that the 

                                                 
1 An application to the Board must be filed within three years after the applicant discovers the alleged 
error in his record. 10 U.S.C. § 1552. 
2  Under 10 U.S.C. § 1551, the statute of limitations of the Discharge Review Board is fifteen years. 
3 Ortiz v. Sec’y of Defense, 41 F.3d 738, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1994)  (holding that “because the Army's regulation 
requires exhaustion of [Discharge] Review Board remedies before the Correction Board will consider an 
application, the Correction Board's three-year statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of 
discharge where, as here, servicemembers timely pursue remedies before the Review Board”). 
4 See United States ex rel. Hirshberg v Malanaphy, 168 F.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. 1948), rev’d on other grounds, 336 
U.S. 210 (1949). 

Coast Guard committed any error in handing his case over to federal civilian authorities 
for prosecution. 

 
5. 

The  applicant  alleged  that  his  conviction  in  a  civilian  court  should  not 
have affected the character of his military discharge.  However, Article 12-B-18.b.(1) of 
the Personnel Manual expressly authorized the separation of a member for misconduct 
due to “[c]onviction by civil authorities … of an offense for which the maximum pen-
alty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice is death or confinement in excess of one 
year.”    Moreover,  the  Article  allowed  the  Commandant  to  award  such  a  member  an 
OTH,  general,  or  honorable  discharge.    The  five  offenses  of  which  the  applicant  was 
convicted each carried a maximum penalty of confinement in excess of one year under 
the UCMJ, and the Board is not persuaded that the Commandant committed any error 
or injustice in awarding the applicant a general discharge under honorable conditions 
in  light  of  his  misconduct.    The  Board  does  not  find  that  the  applicant’s  general  dis-
charge “was disproportionately severe vis-à-vis the conduct in response to which it was 
imposed.”5 

 
6. 

The  applicant  alleged  that  he  waived  his  right  to  an  ADB  because  the 
prosecuting  attorney  was  harassing  his  family;  because  he  was  afraid  he  might  get 
locked up again on a “trumped up charge”; and because he did not want to “have to go 
through a lot more trouble to get this over with.”  The record indicates that on Decem-
ber 29, 1988, and with the advice of counsel, the applicant signed a statement in which 
he voluntarily waived his right to an ADB because he had decided that it would be in 
his own best interest to do so.  The record indicates that the applicant received all due 
process  with  respect  to  his  discharge.    He  has  not  submitted  any  proof  that  he  was 
coerced to sign the waiver.  The Board finds that he has not proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the Coast Guard erred in accepting his waiver and discharging him 
without  convening  an  ADB.    Nor  has  he  proved  that  the  DRB  erred  in  denying  his 
request for an upgraded discharge because of his waiver.  

 
7. 

The applicant alleged that he was innocent and should have been acquit-
ted  on  all  counts.    In  essence,  he  asks  the  Board  to  find  that  the  judge,  jury,  and  the 
Court of Appeals all erred in performing their assigned duties.  The applicant did not 
submit any evidence concerning the charges against him that was not considered by the 
judge, jury, and Court of Appeals.  The letters he has submitted regarding his character 
and community activism do not disprove the charges of which he was convicted.  The 
jury found that he was guilty of those charges “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and the 
Board finds that he has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his general 
                                                 
5  Memorandum  from  John  Hart  Ely,  the  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Transportation,  to  the 
Board for Correction of Military Records dated July 7, 1976.  On March 1, 2003, the Coast Guard and the 
Board  for  Correction  of  Military  Records  transferred  from  the  Department  of  Transportation  to  the 
Department of Homeland Security pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

discharge as a result of the conviction constituted treatment by military authorities that 
“shocks the sense of justice.”6 

 
8. 

The applicant submitted several letters of reference attesting to his good 
character and good work for his community.  However, the delegate of the Secretary 
has  held  that  “the  Board  should  not  upgrade  discharges  solely  on  the  basis  of  post-
service  conduct.”7    Therefore,  although  the  letters  indicate  that  the  applicant  and  his 
wife are very active in their community and have worked hard to improve it, they do 
not justify upgrading his discharge. 

 
9. 

The  Board  concludes  that  the  applicant  has  not  proved  by  a  preponder-
ance of the evidence that his general discharge and lack of retirement pay are erroneous 
or unjust.  Accordingly, his request should be denied. 

 
 
 

 

 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]

                                                 
6 See Sawyer v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 860, 868 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1577 (citing Reale v. 
United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976)). 
7 Memorandum from John Hart Ely, note 5 above.   

ORDER 

 

The application of former xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of his 

military record is denied.   
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

        

 
 Julia Andrews 

 

 

 

 
 
 Nancy L. Friedman 

 

 

 
 Kathryn Sinniger